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ARGUMENT
I. JONES' CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF $ 76-5406.50 YhHS NOT MOOT.
The State does not address the merits of Appellant Christopher Jones' ("Jones")
challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1 )(h) (1999)
(acceptance into a residential treatment center) ("probation statute"). Rather, it merely
asserts that the issue is moot, contending that Jones is disqualified under subsection (l)(f)
of the probation statute (offense not committed in the presence of another person). See
State's Brief ("SB") at p.7-8.
The State's argument is without merit. First, Jones has not had a proper hearing
conducted in accord with due process for the purpose of determining his eligibility under
the other factors set forth in § 76-5-406.5(1). See Appellant's Brief ("AB") Point B. The
only hearing held concerned the constitutionality of subsection (l)(h) as applied to Jones'
case. R.418. In fact, the prosecutor had the same understanding of the purpose of the
hearing as Jones, to wit, that the hearing was only to decide the constitutionality of

subsection (l)(h). R.418[ 17]. In that vein, the prosecutor stated to the court, *'[t]he
defendant has indicated that he canft get into Fremont, because AP&P has made certain
findings. It seems to me that the way to overcome those findings is to have a court
hearing..." Id. Since the hearing was limited in scope to that issue, no other evidence or
witnesses were presented on any of the other eligibility criteria of the probation statute.
R.418. Nonetheless, the trial court made a finding that Jones was disqualified under
subsection (l)(f) notwithstanding the constitutional challenge. R.418[21].
Although the trial court made this finding, it is not a sound one for purposes of the
Statefs mootness argument. Since sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding,
due process requires that a punishment meted out by the court must be based on reliable
and accurate information. See State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994); see also
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In order to ensure reliability and
accuracy, all parties must be able to examine and challenge the evidence. Id
Yet, Jones did not have the opportunity to present any evidence concerning his
eligibility under subsection (l)(f) at the hearing on the constitutionality of subsection
(l)(h). See generally R.418. The State did not present any evidence as to that issue
either. R.418[ 16-19]. In fact, the only comment made by the State regarding Jones'
eligibility under subsection (l)(f) was to illustrate the need for a hearing on the eligibility
criteria. R.418[17]. Without the presentation of the requisite reliable and accurate
information, the trial court could not and did not make a competent decision regarding
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his eligibility. See Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854.
Since the trial court did not make a sound decision regarding his eligibility under
subsection (l)(f), the State's allegation of mootness is without merit. Rather, this Court
should address the constitutionality of subsection (l)(h) since it is critical to a resolution
of Jones' appeal. See Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). Indeed, it is the
preliminary and "essential" question that must be addressed before a hearing on the
eligibility factors can be held. Id.
II. JONES HAS A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A HEARING ON THE
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA.
The State concedes that Jones requested to be sentenced under the probation
statute. See SB 10. The State also concedes that "every criminal defendant convicted of
attempted sodomy upon a child who invokes this statute has a due process right to
present evidence showing that he meets the statute's twelve qualifications." IdL (citing
Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855; State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993)).
Nonetheless, the State contends that Jones' is not entitled to his due process rights
at sentencing. See SB 10-14. It reasons that the trial court found Jones' ineligible under
subsection (l)(f), which renders the need for an eligibility hearing on the other factors
moot since a judge is obliged to deny a defendant probation if he does not meet all the
criteria of the probation statute. The State also suggests that Jones1 waived his right to a
sentencing hearing, contending that Jones admitted to the court that he would be
ineligible for probation if the trial court ruled against him on his constitutional challenge
3

to subsection (l)(h).
As noted supra Point I, the trial court did not make a competent finding regarding
subsection (l)(f) since no evidence at all was presented on that point at the hearing on the
constitutionality of subsection (l)(h). Hence, contrary to the State's position, a hearing is
necessary to get all the accurate and reliable evidence before the court so that it can make
a competent decision as to (l)(f) and the rest of the eligibility criteria.
Moreover, the State's waiver argument is meritless. The State cites defense
counsel out of context. Defense counsel was attempting to explain to the court why he
was not waiving his right to a hearing when he stated, "I didn't feel like it was a
productive use of this Court's time to go through (a) through (k) minus (h), and then at
the end say we can't do (h). That didn't make a lot of judicial sense. Instead, I felt the
better, more appropriate way was to acknowledge the shortcomings, acknowledge that
we didn't have (h), and ask the Court to consider a challenge to the constitutional
application of it." R.418[78].
Hence, so long as an issue as to the constitutionality of subsection (h) remains on
appeal, there is no waiver of the right to the hearing. In fact, Jones expressly stated on
the record that he did not waive an evidentiary hearing on the eligibility factors and that
the trial court incorrectly interpreted that he had. R.418[ 13-14]. He further contested the
trial court's conclusion about waiving the hearing when he refused to approve the court's
written findings and conclusions as to form and withholding his signature from them.
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R.413. The record similarly lacks any evidence of a formal waiver, either written or
through a colloquy between the judge and Jones. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why
any defendant in Jones' position would waive a sentencing hearing when it might mean
the difference between incarceration and placement in a residential treatment center, a far
better option.
Where the evidence of the alleged waiver is ambiguous if not lacking altogether,
waiver cannot be presumed. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^f 55,463 Utah Adv.
Rep. 5; State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ 70. As noted by this Court, "every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of [Jones'] fundamental constitutional rights [at
sentencing must be indulged absent] convincing evidence that such rights were waived."
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at Tf55.
In light of the foregoing, Jones' statement is merely an explanation of the
procedural tack he took to address this discreet constitutional issue and not a waiver of
the hearing. Indeed, there is still an argument to be made under subsection (l)(h), even if
Jones does not prevail on the constitutional challenge. He can still contest AP&P's
conclusion, cross-examine the person who prepared the AP&P report, and present Dr.
Ririe on his own behalf as well as other witnesses who can attest to his suitability for an
in-patient residential treatment program. Although this task would be made easier if he
prevailed on the constitutional issue, it is by no means impossible if not. Consequently,
where critical sentencing issues remain, a hearing is required by due process. See
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Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854.
As a final matter, the State presumes that this Court will affirm the trial court
regarding subsection (l)(h) and therefore seeks as a remedy only vacation of the court's
findings on the other eligibility factors if this Court finds them erroneous. See SB 14.
As noted above, a hearing will still be required under subsection (l)(h) even if Jones'
does not prevail on the constitutional challenge so that he will have the opportunity to
contest AP&P's recommendation regarding placement in a residential abuse treatment
center. Consequently, the State's proposed remedy is not adequate under the
circumstances.
III. THE STATE'S INVITED ERROR CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT.
The State, in a footnote, suggests that Jones' appeal, at least as far as the court's
findings regarding subsection (l)(f), should not be addressed under the invited error
doctrine. See SB n. 1. The State contends that Jones lulled the court into making this
finding when he stated that there was some evidence that could support an ineligibility
finding it if the court chose to believe it. IcL.; see also R.418[15].
The State's argument is without merit because Jones' comment was not a
concession as to ineligibility under (l)(f). Rather, Jones made the statement to illustrate
that there was a dispute on that issue; while the court may believe the State's allegation
that there a third person present when the offense occurred, Jones himself intended to
dispute such evidence at a sentencing hearing. R.418[15]. Considering Jones' position

6

during the entire hearing, emphasizing that he did not waive a sentencing hearing
regarding eligibility under the probation statute, the State's invited error claim is
untenable. See supra Point II.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing and for the reasons set forth in his opening brief, Jones
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand his case tot the trial
court for a sentencing hearing as required by due process and § 76-5-406.5.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30& day of January, 2003.

U * ^ * * 9 . I Ah.
CATHERINE E. LILLY
(J
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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